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Abstract 
 
We assess the impact of the United Kingdom’s 2016 decision to leave the European Union on 
the Council of the EU, where Brexit is likely to have the clearest observable implications. Using 
concepts and models from the spatial model of politics and network analysis, we formulate and 
test expectations regarding the effects of Brexit. We examine two of the most prominent 
datasets on recent decision-making in the EU, which include data on cooperation networks 
among member states before and after the 2016 referendum. Our findings identify some of the 
political challenges that Brexit will bring, but also highlight the factors that are already helping 
the EU’s remaining member states to adapt to Brexit.  
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What impact will Brexit have on the decision-making processes and outputs of the European 
Union (EU)? Much has been written about the causes of Brexit and its possible effects on the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the economic relations between the UK and the EU27 (e.g. 
Armstrong, 2018; Gamble, 2018; Steenbergen and Siczek, 2017). However, there has been little 
systematic analysis of the possible effects of Brexit on the functioning of EU institutions. 
Losing one of its largest member states – in terms of the size of the UK’s population, economy, 
diplomatic resources and military power – could have important consequences for the policies 
that the EU will adopt and for the relations among the remaining states. This is particularly 
plausible with respect to the Council of the EU, the primary intergovernmental institution in 
EU decision-making, and the part of the EU system on which we focus.  
Our study presents comparative quantitative analyses of recent evidence on decision-
making and cooperative relationships among member states. For the most part, the few existing 
studies of the impact of Brexit on the EU rely on qualitative syntheses of expert opinions. For 
instance, Jacobs (2018: 73) posits that Brexit could have a range of significant consequences 
for the power relationships among the remaining EU27, including the possibility of reinforcing 
the power of Germany. He further notes that the consequences of Brexit, while potentially 
significant, are unclear for most of the remaining states. Similarly, Krotz and Schild’s (2018) 
recent study of the effects of Brexit on Franco-German bilateralism presents three contrasting 
scenarios, which include German hegemony, the decline of the European project and a 
rejuvenated Franco-German tandem. An earlier study by Möller and Oliver (2014; see also 
Oliver, 2016) offers a range of perspectives from other countries, including some of the 
remaining EU27 states. While these contributions are informative, they illustrate the wide range 
of expert opinion on this matter. Moreover, the evidence and theories that support their 
conclusions are often unstated. 
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Our analyses assess the emerging impact of Brexit by integrating two established 
approaches to research on the EU’s legislative process. The first approach is based on the spatial 
model of politics, in which actors’ policy positions are represented as points on one or more 
conflict dimensions. The spatial model has been used to formulate and test a broad range of 
rational choice institutional theories of the EU’s decision-making process, including theories 
that focus on formal legislative procedures (e.g. Crombez, 1996; Steunenberg, 1994; Tsebelis 
and Garrett, 2000), and informal bargaining (e.g. Achen, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and 
Stokman, 1994). We use the dataset from the Decision-making in the EU (DEU) project, which 
includes information on EU actors’ policy positions on controversial legislative proposals that 
were on the agenda in the period 2004-2008, before the prospect of Brexit arose. Comparisons 
of member states’ policy positions in these data with their policy positions in previous periods 
reveal a significant degree of stability (e.g. Thomson, 2011). While we cannot know if member 
states’ policy positions will be similar in the future, the stability of these data in the past 
indicates that they provide an informative basis for assessing the impact of Brexit. In the first 
step in our analysis, we apply a bargaining model, which in previous work generated the most 
accurate forecasts of decision outcomes (Thomson et al., 2006). We compare the forecasts of 
the bargaining model with and without the UK included as a member of the EU. These 
comparisons indicate some of the pressures to which the remaining member states will need to 
respond in a post-Brexit EU. 
The analysis then turns to network analysis. One of the main insights from network 
analysis is that mapping both the direct and indirect ties among actors in a political system is 
essential to understanding how the system works, both with respect to how those actors compete 
for influence, and how they cooperate to solve collective action problems (Feiock and Scholz, 
2010;  Knoke et al., 1996; Laumann and Knoke, 1987). The exit of any one of the actors from 
a network has obvious implications for the direct relations between that actor and the others 
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with which it is connected. Exits also have less obvious implications for the indirect relations 
between the remaining actors. For instance, if an actor forms a bridge between otherwise 
unconnected or weakly connected pairs of other actors, then its removal could have significant 
consequences for the remaining actors far beyond the impact of its direct relations.  
We use data from the Negotiations in the Council of the European Union (NCEU) 
project (Naurin, 2015; Naurin et al., 2017), which includes observations from 2018. The NCEU 
project has systematically surveyed member state representatives in each of the main working 
groups of the Council to identify the main cooperation partners of each of the states. Using this 
information, we assess the impact of the UK’s exit on the direct and indirect relations among 
the remaining member states. We do so by calculating well-established measures of network 
centrality with and without the UK included in the network. These comparisons provide an 
indication of the changes in the cooperation network to which the remaining member states will 
need to adapt and are already adapting. 
We integrate the spatial modelling and network analysis in two ways. First, we focus 
on the compensating measures that could be taken, and that to some extent already have been 
taken, by the remaining states most disadvantaged by Brexit. These disadvantaged states 
include Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden. The analysis reveals that these states 
are likely to become significantly less central in Council networks if they do not take 
compensating measures. The data from the spatial modelling approach enable us to identify the 
other states with which each of these Brexit-disadvantaged states shared similar policy positions 
in the past. The analysis shows that most of the Brexit losers have opportunities to compensate 
for the threatened reduction in centrality by forming new relationships with likeminded others. 
The analysis also shows that some of these new relationships have already been formed. 
The second way in which we integrate the two approaches is by modelling the 
development of the network in one of the key committees, the Permanent Representatives 
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Committee I (COREPER I), in 2018 using an Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM). 
This model includes indicators of the expected effects of Brexit on each state’s network 
centrality and an indicator of the similarity between states in terms of their previous policy 
positions as explanatory variables. This combination of network characteristics and policy 
affinity proved to be a powerful explanation of the evolution of cooperation networks in the 
Council in previous research (Huhe et al., 2018). The ERGM provides strong support for our 
argument that the cooperation network is adapting in response to the prospect of Brexit, and 
that states’ policy affinity with each other is significantly shaping this adaptation.  
 
Spatial modelling 
 
One of the most extensive applications of the spatial model to everyday EU decision-making is 
found in the DEU dataset, which describes specific controversies that were raised by legislative 
proposals (Thomson et al., 2006, 2012). We focus on the 56 legislative proposals in the DEU 
dataset that were discussed in the period 2004-2008, when the EU consisted of 25 and then 27 
member states after the enlargement to include Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. We use the DEU 
data from the post-2004 period because with the exception of Croatia, these data cover the same 
group of member states as the current and post-Brexit EU.  
Although the information on member states’ policy positions dates from 2004 to 2008, 
it offers an informative basis for assessing the impact of Brexit a decade later. Previous research 
that compared these data with earlier observations from the late 1990s and early 2000s found a 
large amount of stability in the content of the issues on the EU’s agenda before and after the 
2004 enlargement (Thomson, 2011: 51-78). Furthermore, to the extent that there was structure 
in the alignments of actors’ positions, there was a stable divide between the Northern and 
Southern member states of the EU15 before and after the 2004 enlargement. The member states 
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that joined in 2004 tended to take similar policy positions, again to the extent that the data 
exhibited stable structures in the alignments of actors’ policy positions. Alongside these 
patterns, previous analyses of EU actors’ policy positions using both DEU data and other 
sources have revealed persistent diversity, which we also expect to continue.  
Notwithstanding the abovementioned patterns, there are no fixed coalitions in the Council and 
alignments of states are typically formed on an issue-by-issue basis (Heyes-Renshaw and 
Wallace, 2006: 250). This has been the case in the past decades and is unlikely to change in a 
post-Brexit EU, which makes the post-2004 DEU data relevant to our inquiry. Moreover, 
Jacobs (2018: 103) concludes that there are ‘unlikely to be fundamental shifts’ in the EU’s 
policy agenda following Brexit, with issues such as the ‘development of the single market 
(notably the digital single market), further progress on the capital markets and banking unions, 
on the energy union and on fighting climate change’ continuing to dominate.  Nevertheless, we 
acknowledge the inherent uncertainty in assessing the impact of unfolding events. We cannot 
say for sure that the previous patterns will continue, or that the expected effects of Brexit will 
not be overshadowed by other major events.  
The DEU dataset describes in detail the main controversial issues raised by the 
legislative proposals and the policy alternatives favoured the member states, the Commission 
and the European Parliament. The proposals raised on average between two and three main 
controversial issues, and there are 158 controversial issues in the post-2004 part of the dataset. 
Semi-structured interviews with key informants were conducted to describe the issues and the 
positions of the actors. Overall, more than 230 semi-structured interviews were held. Most of 
the interviewees were officials from the permanent representations or the primarily responsible 
officials in the Commission.  
The dataset describes each of the controversial issues in a standard way to facilitate 
comparison across issues. Each controversial issue is described as a policy scale ranging from 
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0 to 100. The endpoints represent the most ‘extreme’ positions under consideration by the 
actors. The key informants placed intermediate positions on the scale to reflect the relative 
political distances between the alternatives. The key informants estimated the policy alternative 
most favoured by each of the actors at the outset of the negotiations, just after the introduction 
of the legislative proposal by the Commission. The policy scales are comparable in the sense 
that they reflect the range of the bargaining space on each controversy. In addition to estimating 
the positions of the actors, the informants also estimated the salience of the issues to the actors, 
again on a scale of 0 to 100.  
Figure 1 depicts one of the controversial issues described in the DEU dataset. The case 
refers to an issue raised by the proposal to extend the EU’s emission trading scheme to aviation 
activities. The controversy concerned the extent to which the auctioning of carbon credits 
should be allowed. The positions ranged from those that opposed the introduction of auctioning 
(the 12 actors referred to on the left hand side of the figure) to those, including the European 
Parliament, that supported the maximum possible extension of the scheme. The actual decision 
outcome introduced a modest amount of auctioning, which our informants placed at position 
30 on the policy scale. The UK favoured the introduction of somewhat more extensive 
auctioning, and was placed at position 50 on the policy scale to represent its position.  
 
<Figure 1 here> 
 
The effect of the UK’s exit on decision outcomes depends in part on the positions 
typically taken by the UK representation. Previous research indicates that the UK’s positions 
generally favour lower levels of regulation and EU subsidies than those of most other states. Of 
the 158 issues raised by the post-2004 legislative proposals in the dataset, the UK took the same 
positions as Sweden on 52%, as the Netherlands on 49% and as Ireland on 47%, compared to 
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the same positions as Italy on 32% and Spain on 32% too. These patterns determine the 
expected effects of Brexit on decision outcomes.  
We apply a simple bargaining model of the legislative decision-making process, in 
which decision outcomes are reached through compromise and cooperative behaviour. This 
view of the decision-making process is encapsulated in the so-called compromise model, which 
is a first-order approximation of the famous Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) (Achen, 2006: 
98-101). When the disagreement outcome is extremely undesirable, the NBS can be represented 
in a very simple form. As the value that each of the actors attaches to the disagreement outcome 
becomes smaller and smaller, the NBS approaches a weighted average of actors’ positions and 
at the limit, is identical to the weighted average. In Achen’s (2006) operationalisation of the 
NBS, the weights assigned to actors’ positions are the products of actors’ capabilities and issue 
salience.1 
The compromise model always generates a decision outcome that lies between the most 
extreme positions taken by any of the actors with capabilities. The exclusion of an actor from 
the compromise model always results in a prediction further from that actor’s position as long 
as the excluded actor takes a position on the issue and has a salience score of greater than zero. 
In our analyses, having a position implies a positive salience score. 
The analysis indicates that the departure of the UK leads to modest changes to the 
location of the decision outcomes on the majority of issues according to the logic of the 
compromise model. While the average magnitude of these changes is small, the results depicted 
in Figure 2 indicate that there are clear patterns. Each of the issues was examined to ascertain 
whether it involved choices between more or less integration, more or less regulation, and/or 
higher or lower subsidies. First, the outcomes predicted by the compromise model without the 
UK are not significantly more pro-integration than its predictions with the UK included. 
Second, the outcomes predicted without the UK are significantly more regulatory than the 
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outcomes predicted with the UK. Third, the outcomes predicted without the UK involve 
significantly higher subsidies than the outcomes predicted with the UK.  
 
<Figure 2> 
 
There are also patterns concerning the location of the predicted outcomes in relation to 
other member states’ positions. Outcomes without the UK will be somewhat closer to the 
positions of Spain and significantly further from the positions of Sweden, which accords with 
the observation that the UK’s positions are generally furthest away from Spain and closest to 
Sweden. Finally, and by definition, decision outcomes without the UK are significantly further 
away from the UK’s preferred positions. 
In a supplementary analysis (presented in the Online appendix), we applied a different 
model of the EU’s legislative process, and the results also suggest that removing the UK from 
the EU will have modest effects. We applied a model of the legislative process that is based on 
the EU’s legislative procedures (Crombez, 1996; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). The results 
indicate that removing the UK rarely changes the process or outcomes fundamentally. The 
location of the pivotal position changes in only 8% of issues and the outcome changes in only 
5% of issues. We present the results of the bargaining model, because this model outperformed 
procedural models in previous comparisons of the accuracy of their forecasts (Thomson et al., 
2006). 
 
Network analysis 
 
Social capital theory makes clear why network relations are relevant to the capacity of a group 
of actors, in this case member states in the Council, to solve collective action problems. 
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Networks are social structures that link actors to each other through multiple direct and indirect 
relationships (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Schneider et al., 1997). These relationships are 
important partly for facilitating effective information flow, which is essential in the context of 
international cooperation where states are uncertain of each other’s preferences (Keohane, 
1984). Network relations are also channels through which actors monitor and sanction each 
other for violating social norms. The effectiveness of information flow and sanctioning 
mechanisms affects the trust that actors in a network have in each other, which is referred to as 
social capital. This in turn affects the ability of the network to solve collective action problems. 
Burt (2005) formalised the concepts of bridging and bonding ties from social capital theory. 
These concepts are closely related to the network measures of betweenness and closeness, 
which we examine below. 
Information on the network relations among member state representatives was obtained 
through a survey of officials from the representations of all member states to the EU, as part of 
the NCEU project. The data have been used extensively in previous research (e.g. Häge and 
Naurin, 2013; Huhe et al., 2018; Naurin and Lindahl, 2010). The NCEU project surveyed 
representatives from all member states in eleven selected committees and working parties in 
the Council. The ‘Council preparatory bodies’ consist of more than 150 committees and 
working parties, where most of the negotiations take place. The eleven selected committees and 
working parties represent committees at different levels of the Council hierarchy and a broad 
range of policy areas. The policy areas included range from economic policy, agricultural 
policy, foreign and security policy, environmental policy, competition and internal market 
policy, to tax policy and justice and home affairs.2 
In the surveys, the following question was asked: ‘Which member states do you most 
often cooperate with within your working group, in order to develop a common position?’. 
Respondents were free to list other member states with which they cooperated, and typically 
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mentioned between three and five others. On the basis of the respondents’ answers to this 
question, we identify the network relations between member states. In our network analysis, a 
line connects two states if an official in at least one of the two states reported a cooperative tie 
when interviewed. Our theoretical definition of a cooperative network relationship is that it is 
reciprocal. However, we include directed relationships as an indication of the presence of a 
cooperative tie for measurement reasons. The survey question encourages respondents to name 
the most frequently used cooperation partners, rather than all cooperation partners. This is likely 
to bias the responses to the most salient cooperation partners. To overcome this limitation, we 
chose this inclusive operationalisation, which assumes that a tie exists if at least one of the two 
states reports it. 
The concept of network relationships from social capital theory is broader than the 
operationalisation we use. While social capital theory refers to multiple direct and indirect 
relationships though which information flows, our operationalisation focuses more narrowly on 
cooperative relationships. These are likely to be a subset of a broader set of relationships 
through which information flows. Nonetheless, cooperative relationships are an especially 
important type, because they allow information to flow among actors that are embedded in trust 
relations with each other. This adds to the credibility of the information that is passed through 
these channels. Moreover, we do not argue that member states that do not cooperate with each 
other according to their answers to the NCEU survey cannot contact each other directly. Clearly 
all member states have diplomatic relations with each other. However, we argue that state 
representatives’ answers to the NCEU survey contain valuable information on the depth of the 
relationships, and therefore on the ease of communication between each pair of permanent 
representations.  
We focus on the three most recent surveys from the NCEU project, in 2012, 2015 and 
2018, which are most relevant to assessing the impact of Brexit in terms of the pressure it will 
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impose on the existing cooperation networks. The interviews were conducted by telephone and 
had response rates of 84% in 2012 (249 officials interviewed), 73% in 2015 (225 officials 
interviewed) and 81% in 2018 (251 officials interviewed).  
Figure 3 begins with a visualisation to illustrate the data we are using. It depicts the 
cooperation network of COREPER I in 2015 and 2018, i.e. before and after the Brexit vote. 
COREPER I is the pinnacle coordinating committee in the Council regarding legislative 
proposals across all core policy areas of the EU. A line connects two states if an official in at 
least one of the two states reported a cooperative tie when interviewed. The graphs indicate 
some instability in the UK’s cooperative relationships between 2015 and 2018. It has five direct 
ties in both years. However, only the tie with the Czech Republic is constant. Between 2015 
and 2018, the UK’s ties with Cyprus, Denmark, Malta and Sweden are replaced by ties with 
Bulgaria, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain. Based on this visual inspection, however, it is not 
clear whether the UK has in fact suffered from a loss of centrality in terms of its indirect ties. 
A visual inspection of the graphs mainly clarifies the direct impact of Brexit on the UK’s direct 
ties, not its indirect effects. 
 
<Figure 3> 
 
We first focus on the likely consequences of Brexit on the centrality of the network 
positions of each of the other member states combining the information from 2012 and 2015. 
The reason for focusing on these waves is that in this first step of the analysis we wish to identify 
the likely effects of the UK’s decision to leave the EU on the cooperative relations, rather than 
the emerging responses to it by the remaining EU members. The three most prominent measures 
of centrality in network analysis are degree centrality, closeness and betweenness. Degree 
centrality refers simply to the number of direct ties an actor has. Using this measure, we can 
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only detect the impact of Brexit on states that had direct cooperative ties with the UK. Based 
on degree centrality, the countries that are expected to suffer most from Brexit are those that 
had direct relationships with the UK across a broad range of committees, notably Denmark, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. In contrast, for member states that had fewer direct ties 
with the UK, such as Austria, Belgium, Greece and Spain, the impacts of Brexit on their overall 
degree centrality are negligible.  
Closeness and betweenness offer more refined and interesting measures of the impact 
of Brexit, and these are depicted in Figure 4. These measures are influenced by both direct and 
indirect ties, and therefore incorporate more information on the possible implications of Brexit 
on the remaining member states. Closeness centrality focuses on how close a member state is 
to all other members in the Council. The idea is that a member state is central if it can quickly 
interact with all other member states through a small number of links. The average of the 
shortest paths between each state and each of the other states is the most important part of the 
measure of closeness. The measure takes a higher value for actors that are generally closer to 
others. Note that if member state i is connected to member state j by both the UK and several 
other states, then i’s shortest path length to j does not necessarily increase as a result of the UK 
leaving. The measure of betweenness, by contrast, focuses on how central an actor is based on 
the frequency of its role as an intermediary between other actors. The key component of the 
measure of betweenness is the number of times a member state is a bridge along the shortest 
path between two other states.  
We calculated the closeness and betweenness measures for each member state before 
and after removing UK from the 22 committee and working group networks, which were 
surveyed in 2012 and 2015. The significance tests noted in Figure 4 refer to the paired t-tests 
to assess the significance of the differences for each member state. 
 
 
 
 
14 
<Figure 4> 
 
The top of Figure 4 indicates that nine member states, including Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Ireland, are likely to be negatively and significantly affected by Brexit with 
respect to closeness. These countries rely on the UK as an intermediary to reach other member 
states in a range of committees.  
We observe much larger variations in member states’ betweenness than in their 
closeness scores. Member states rely heavily on a few intermediate players, in particular France, 
Germany and Poland, to reach other remote partners. The comparisons of the betweenness 
measures indicate that the mediating roles of these prominent players are further strengthened 
by the UK’s exit from the EU Council. We find that eight countries’ betweenness scores 
significantly increase by taking the UK out of the networks. Among these eight states, the 
positions of France, Germany and Poland are particularly strengthened.  
 
Integrating network analysis and the spatial model 
 
The analyses in this section integrate the network analysis and the spatial model to investigate 
the ways in which the remaining member states can and are already adapting to Brexit. We 
present two related analyses: the first focuses on the nine states that we expect to experience a 
significant fall in closeness centrality as a result of Brexit (Figure 4); and the second focuses 
on all remaining member states and how their network relations developed in 2018 in response 
to the prospect of Brexit.  
The main question for our first analysis is to what extent the nine Brexit losers could 
form new cooperative relationships with other states, with which they were not directly linked 
in 2015 and with which they share similar levels of policy agreement, as they did with the UK, 
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which would return them to at least the same level of centrality. In addition to identifying 
potential new relationships that would benefit the nine Brexit losers, we identify the new 
cooperative relationships that were actually formed in 2018. Our focus here is on COREPER I. 
Figure 5 depicts the opportunities each of these nine states has to mitigate the negative 
impact of Brexit on its network centrality by forming new cooperative relationships with other 
states. We begin with the Czech Republic in Figure 5(a). The horizontal dashed line represents 
the Czech Republic’s pre-Brexit level of centrality (measured by closeness), while the origin of 
the y-axis is the level to which the Czech Republic’s centrality is expected to drop following 
Brexit before any actions by the Czech Republic in response to Brexit. The location of France, 
which is high on the y-axis and well above the horizontal dashed line, indicates that if the Czech 
Republic were to form a cooperative relationship with France, this would more than compensate 
for its loss of centrality due to Brexit. France is just to the left of the vertical dashed line, 
indicating that there was slightly less policy agreement between the Czech Republic and France 
as there was between the Czech Republic and the UK in the recent past. There are five countries 
located in the top-right corner of Figure 5(a), which include Portugal. New ties between the 
Czech Republic and any one of these states would bring the Czech Republic to a higher level 
of centrality than it had prior to the UK’s exit. Moreover, the Czech Republic had a higher level 
of policy affinity with these five than it had with the UK in the recent past. New cooperative 
relationships were formed in 2018 between the Czech Republic and the five circled member 
states: Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Malta and Estonia.  
 
<Figure 5> 
 
We briefly highlight the main findings for each of the other eight states: 
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Denmark (Figure 5(b)) has fewer opportunities to compensate the loss in centrality compared 
to the Czech Republic. The top-right corner of the graph for Denmark is empty, which means 
that there is no other state with which Denmark had more policy agreement than it had with the 
UK, and with which it could form a new tie that would compensate for the reduction in its 
centrality as a consequence of Brexit. The best option for Denmark is to cultivate new 
relationships with France, Greece, Ireland and Belgium. In fact, new cooperative relationships 
were formed between Denmark on the one hand and Ireland and Belgium on the other in 2018. 
Finland (Figure 5(c)) should prioritise the cultivation of new cooperative relationships with 
Portugal, Greece, Belgium and Ireland. In fact, in 2018, a new cooperative relationship was 
formed between Finland and Ireland. 
Ireland (Figure 5(d)) should prioritise Belgium. New links with Greece, Denmark, Finland and 
the Netherlands would also compensate for Brexit, and Ireland has had only somewhat less 
policy affinity with these countries than it had with the UK. The 2018 data indicate that new 
relationships emerged with Denmark, the Netherlands and Finland. 
Lithuania (Figure 5(e)) and Latvia (Figure 5(f)) have many opportunities to form new 
relationships that would more than compensate for Brexit with states with which they were at 
least as like-minded as they were with the UK. Only Latvia and Sweden formed a new tie in 
2018. 
Malta (Figure 5(g)) too has many opportunities to form compensating new links. The three 
Baltic states and Poland stand out as states that could bring Malta up to a higher level of 
centrality than Malta had before Brexit. Moreover, Malta agreed more with these states on 
policy issues than it did with the UK in the recent past. The data show seven new ties involving 
Malta in 2018. 
The Netherlands (Figure 5(h)) and Sweden (Figure 5(i)) are in similar positions to each other in 
that there are no other states with which they are currently not linked, with which they agreed 
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as much as they did with the UK, and with which a new relationship would bring them back to 
the same level of centrality or higher as they had prior to Brexit. However, for both the 
Netherlands and Sweden, forming a new cooperative relationship with each other would be 
advantageous. Indeed, the 2018 data indicate that a new tie emerged between the Netherlands 
and Sweden among several other new cooperative relationships. 
Our analysis so far has indicated that the nine likely Brexit losers have different 
opportunities for compensating the loss in centrality that Brexit may bring, and that some of 
these opportunities were taken in 2018.  
We now turn to the second analysis that integrates the network and spatial modelling 
perspectives, which takes the form of an ERGM of the 2018 COREPER I cooperation network. 
The ERGM, also known as the p* model (Robins et al., 2007), was introduced to model 
complex dependencies in a given network. It allows us to estimate the effects of structural 
properties of the network and covariates associated with individual nodes, in our case member 
states, on the probability that ties exist between nodes. The structural properties include density 
(overall connectivity in the network), homophily (such as policy affinity between states), and 
transitivity. Transitivity is the commonly found pattern where friends of friends are friends. The 
relevant covariates associated with individual member states are the expected centrality losses 
(in terms of degree, closeness and betweenness) as a result of Brexit. The ERGM can be written 
as follows, 
Pr(𝐘 = 𝑦𝑖𝑗) =
1
𝜅
∙ exp {∑𝜂𝐴𝑔𝐴(𝑦)}, 
where yij denotes a tie in the cooperation network Y, and κ is the normalising constant. gA(y) 
represents our model terms and ηA is the corresponding coefficient. 
We focus on three types of model terms (i.e. gA(y)): transitivity, homophily, and nodal 
attributes of expected network loss.  First, transitivity refers to the network mechanism that two 
member states are more likely form a cooperative tie if they share common partners.  
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Transitivity not only helps explain how cooperation can move beyond simple dyadic 
reciprocity, but also is the driving mechanism behind dense local clusters, which are common 
in various cooperation networks. Considering the fact that two countries could share multiple 
common partners and the marginal impacts of additional common partners are likely to 
diminish, we use the geometrically weighted edge-wise shared partner distribution (GWESP), 
rather than the raw numbers of triangles (Hunter, 2007).  This allows us to assign more weights 
to dyads with few common partners. Second, we expect homophily in the form of policy affinity 
to affect how states form cooperative ties, as found in previous research using similar datasets 
(Huhe et al., 2018). Finally, we estimate the effects of each state’s expected changes in 
centrality as a result of Brexit. We include each state’s expected changes in centrality in terms 
of degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality. We first estimate a baseline model (1) with 
GWESP, and then we add the homophily term of policy affinity (model 2), nodal attribute terms 
of expected degree loss (model 3), closeness loss (model 4), and betweenness loss (model 5), 
respectively. A saturated model (6) incorporates all these terms. Finally, we estimate a full 
model (7) without degree loss, which is correlated with closeness loss.3 
 
<Table 1> 
 
Table 1 presents the models.4  Models 1 and 2 confirm the earlier findings of Huhe et 
al. (2018) by showing that both shared partners (i.e. transitivity as measured by GWESP) and 
policy affinity (i.e. homophily) facilitate the formation of cooperative ties between EU member 
states. ERGM coefficients are similar to those of logistic regression, indicating the log-odds of 
tie formation. Taking model 2 as an example, for a pair of nodes with no shared partner and 
policy affinity of zero, the log-odds of a tie between them is −7.08 + (1.86×0) + (9.59×0) = 
−7.04, and its corresponding probability is 
exp(−7.08)
1+exp⁡(−7.08)
= 0.0008.  In contrast, if the policy 
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affinity score is 0.5, the probability of a cooperative tie is 0.092; when the policy affinity 
reaches 1, the probably of a tie increases to 0.925. 
More importantly, models 3, 4 and 5 show that the effects of expected centrality losses 
from Brexit have induced significant changes to patterns of cooperation. Model 3 shows that 
degree loss is positively and significantly associated with formation of cooperative ties. This 
suggests that controlling for clusters (i.e. GWESP) and policy affinity, the UK’s direct partners 
in the 2015 COREPER I network were more likely to form cooperative ties in 2018. 
Specifically, states that were not linked to the UK in 2015 have a probability of 0.084 of forming 
cooperative ties (assuming zero shared partners and a policy affinity score of 0.5), while similar 
states that were linked to the UK in 2015 have a probability of 0.149 of forming cooperative 
ties. In other words, the UK’s direct partners in 2015 are significantly more active than non-
UK partners in the 2018 COREPER I network. Model 4 points to the significant and positive 
impact of loss in closeness. Unlike degree, closeness captures connectivity by taking both direct 
and indirect relationships into account. The results thus suggest that countries that expected 
losses in closeness were more likely to forge cooperative ties in 2018. In model 5, we find that 
betweenness gain significantly and positively affects tie formation. As revealed earlier, Brexit 
is expected to elevate the importance of remaining brokering countries such as France, 
Germany, and Poland. Our ERGM analysis confirms this; countries that are expected to become 
more central (in betweenness centrality) following Brexit are more likely to be connected to 
other countries in 2018. The expected gain in betweenness makes these states more attractive 
cooperation partners. Other countries, including those that are expected to suffer losses in 
centrality from Brexit, are likely to seek ties with these increasingly important brokers.  Model 
6 incorporates all three centrality measurements.  While degree loss and betweenness gain 
remain statistically significant, closeness loss does not. One reason is that measurements of 
centrality, degree and closeness centralities are correlated (i.e. collinearity). We thus drop 
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degree loss in the full model and find significant impacts of both closeness loss and betweenness 
gain.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Our findings indicate some of the pressures that Brexit will impose on the EU, characteristics 
that will help the EU to meet these challenges, and emerging behaviour in response to the 
prospect of Brexit. Our analyses suggest that Brexit will put pressure on decision outcomes to 
be somewhat more regulatory rather than liberal in terms of levels of market intervention, and 
related to this, somewhat more inclined to provide subsidies. A corollary is that there will be 
pressure on decision outcomes to be somewhat closer to the policy positions typically taken by 
Spain and further away from the positions taken by Sweden. This is due to the fact that the UK 
has usually been on the free market side of controversies concerning the level of regulatory 
intervention, and generally an ally of Sweden, among other states, on a substantial proportion 
of controversial issues.  
Some member states face particularly significant challenges as a consequence of Brexit. 
The mediating roles of the remaining larger member states, in particular France, Germany and 
Poland, are likely to be enhanced by Brexit. Some smaller and medium sized states – Denmark, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden – confront the toughest challenges in maintaining their 
influence in the Council. These are the states with the closest network ties to the UK, and with 
the most similar policy positions.  
The pressures on the EU imposed by Brexit will be ameliorated by the lack of structure 
in the policy positions of member states. The consequence of this lack of structure is that taking 
any one of the actors out of the process seldom leads to radically different decision outcomes 
across a range of issues in terms of more or less integration or regulation, or higher or lower 
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subsidies. While previous research identified some regularities in the policy positions taken by 
member states, these regularities occur in a minority of cases. This means that states which 
agree with each other on some issues disagree with each other on other issues. This overall lack 
of structure in the positions of member states has been found in previous qualitative and 
quantitative research (Heyes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006: 250; Thomson, 2011). This lack of 
structure also supports the dominant mode of cooperative bargaining in the EU, where decision 
outcomes are most accurately modelled as compromises that take into account the policy 
positions of all actors (Achen, 2006).  
Another characteristic of the EU’s political system that ameliorates the impact of Brexit 
is the stock of network capital held by member states and member states’ ability to build new 
network capital. This refers to the density of direct and indirect cooperative relationships among 
to the remaining EU27 states. Scholarship in the field of network analysis has shown that 
informal ties are essential to how actors compete for influence and how they solve collective 
action problems (e.g. Feiock and Scholz, 2010; Laumann and Knoke, 1987). Our analysis of 
the most recent network data from 2018 indicates that the remaining EU27 are already building 
new network capital. Those states that are directly and negatively impacted by Brexit are most 
active in forming new ties, and the large states, whose mediating roles are expected to grow, 
are gaining new ties. These new informal structures are likely to endure regardless of the form 
and timing of the UK’s eventual departure from the EU, which is uncertain at the time of 
writing. The findings indicate how informal institutions, of which network ties are an example, 
are constructed by the same actors that they enable and constrain. By being aware of and 
actively responding to the pressures that Brexit will bring, the EU has the capacity to adapt 
successfully.  
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Figures and tables 
 
 
What are the positions of the actors regarding the auctioning of carbon credits? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. One of the main controversial issues raised by proposal on the inclusion of aviation in 
the emission trading scheme Note: Proposal COD/2006/304. COM: Commission; EP: European 
Parliament; AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; BG: Bulgaria; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: 
Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland: FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; 
IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; 
PT: Portugal; RO: Romania; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United 
Kingdom. 
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Figure 2. The directional impact of Brexit on decision outcomes according to the 
bargaining model 
Note: Circles refer to the average impact of Brexit, bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals, 
and diamonds refer the minimum and maximum values. Numbers in parentheses are the 
numbers of relevant post-20014 issues from the DEU II dataset.  
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Figure 3: Cooperation network in COREPER I in 2015 and 2018 compared 
Note: Lines indicate the presence of a cooperative relationship between the two connected states 
as indicated by key informants’ responses in the NCEU survey in 2015 (left) and 2018 (right). 
Excludes Croatia 
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Figure 4: Country-based comparison of changes in closeness and betweenness 
Note: Based on NCEU surveys in 2012 and 2015 combined. **p<0.05 
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Figure 5. The expected impact of Brexit and new relationships in COREPER I in 2018 
Note: Horizontal dashed lines indicate the pre-Brexit level of closeness for the focus state in 
2015. The origin of the y-axis is the expected post-Brexit level of closeness. Vertical dashed 
lines indicate the proportion of issues on which the focus state and the UK had the same policy 
positions. Member states in each graph are those with which the focus state did not have a tie 
in 2015. The circled member states are those with which a new tie was formed in 2018. 
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Figure 5 (continued). The expected impact of Brexit and new relationships in COREPER 
I in 2018 
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Table 1. ERGM Analysis of COREPER I in 2018 
 
Dependent variable: 
COREPER I in 2018, yij = Y 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Edges -3.48*** -7.08*** -7.55*** -7.36*** -7.44*** -8.57*** -8.37*** 
 (0.74) (0.98) (0.99) (1.00) (1.01) (1.11) (1.08) 
GWESP 1.99*** 1.86*** 1.80*** 1.82** 1.75** 1.64** 1.65** 
 (0.69) (0.71) (0.70) (0.72) (0.69) (0.74) (0.74) 
Policy affinity  9.59*** 10.33*** 9.94*** 10.27*** 12.04*** 11.49*** 
  (1.68) (1.75) (1.69) (1.81) (1.91) (1.84) 
Degree loss   0.64***   0.94**  
   (0.23)   (0.44)  
Closeness loss    28.30*  11.65 68.54*** 
    (16.10)  (33.55) (20.22) 
Betweenness gain     18.81*** 30.19*** 31.13*** 
     (7.03) (8.05) (8.12) 
AIC 347.08 309.39 303.99 308.37 303.70 291.36 294.07 
BIC 354.65 320.74 319.13 323.51 318.84 314.07 312.99 
Log Likelihood -171.54 -151.70 -148.00 -150.19 -147.85 -139.68 -142.03 
Note: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.  
GWESP: Geometrically weighted edge-wise shared partner distribution. 
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1 We operationalise capabilities as informal bargaining power and use as a proxy measure the 
log of member states’ population sizes (in millions plus one). This measure is highly correlated 
with previous expert judgements of the relative power of states in which large states have more 
power than small and medium states, but small and medium states are overrepresented relative 
to their population sizes. Although we consider this measure to be more appropriate given our 
concept of capabilities, we obtain the same results using voting power indicies as proxy 
measures. 
2 The eleven committees are: COREPER I, COREPER II, the Political Security Committee 
(PSC), the Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA), the Economic Policy Committee (EPC), 
the Politico-Military Group (PMG), the Working Party on Tax Questions, the Coordinating 
committee in the Area of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (CATS), the 
Working Party on Agricultural Questions, the Working Party on Competitiveness and Growth, 
and the Working Party on the Environment.  
3  The edges term in the ERGM is similar to the constant term in other statistical models.  It 
captures the overall connectivity of a network.  In the null model that includes only the edges 
term, its coefficient is −1.12.  This is the average log-odds that two nodes are connected.  Its 
corresponding probability, 
exp(−1.12)
1+exp⁡(−1.12)
= 0.246, thus equals the density of the network, 
80×2
26(26−1)
= 0.246.  In other words, on average a node in this network has a probability of 0.246 
to form a cooperative tie with another node.  
4  The results of goodness-of-fit analyses are presented in the Online appendix. 
                                                 
